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The  dispersion  in  current  account  balances  among  countries  in  the  euro  area  has 
widened markedly over the past decade-and-a-half, and especially since 1999. We decompose 
current account positions for euro area countries into intra-euro-area balances and extra-euro-
area  balances  and  examine  the  determinants  of  these  balances.  Regarding  intra-euro-area 
balances, we present evidence that capital tends to flow from high-income euro area economies 
to low-income euro area economies. These flows have increased since the creation of the single 
currency in Europe.  
We construct a novel data set regarding extra-euro-area balances. The data set contains, 
for the euro area and the most important member economies, exports and imports to and from 
the 10 respective most important trade partners outside the euro area. This allows us to study 
the determinants of the extra-euro current account and its interaction with intra-euro area trade 
balances. We estimate a model of the trade balance of the euro area and individual euro-area 
countries with the rest of the world.  We find that a real appreciation of the euro against the 
currencies of its main trading partners appears to have a substantial effect on the euro area’s 
net exports in the long run, though the immediate effect is small. Our estimates for individual 
countries suggest that the adjustment to a real appreciation of the euro would not be equally 
distributed across euro-area countries. In particular, Germany would bear the largest share of 
the  adjustment,  while  the  other  large  euro-area  economies  would  be  relatively  unaffected. 
Finally, we find that the introduction of the euro seems to have changed the dynamics of trade 
balance adjustment in three of the larger euro-area economies. 








The observation of rising and persistent global imbalances has been the focus of lively 
debate among policymakers and academic economists in recent years. Most of that debate has 
concentrated on the large U.S. current account deficit and its main counterpart, the large current 
account surpluses of countries in Asia. Europe has not attracted much attention in this debate, 
most  likely  because  European  countries  and  the  European  Union  as  a  whole  have  a  long 
tradition of keeping their current accounts relatively close to balance (see Ahearne and von 
Hagen,  2005).  Nevertheless,  current  account  developments  in  Europe  deserve  attention  for 
several  reasons.  For  starters,  current  account  imbalances  within  the  EU  and,  in  particular, 
among the countries participating in European Monetary Union (EMU) have grown considerably 
in recent years. A natural question to ask is whether these imbalances can be explained by 
fundamental economic factors or whether they might point to a potential unsustainability of the 
common currency. 
In addition, as argued in Ahearne and von Hagen (2005), Europe, and the euro area in 
particular, might be forced to run significant current account deficits in the future, if the United 
States takes action to close its current account deficit or the U.S. dollar depreciates sharply and 
the Asian countries insist on running surpluses and start accumulating euro reserves instead of 
dollar reserves. The question here is: What are the consequences of a significant appreciation of 
the euro for the euro area’s current account position? 
This paper explores the determinants of the current account balances of the euro area 
and individual member countries of the euro area. We are interested in both intra-euro-area and 
extra-euro-area current account balances. Below, we look at the issue from two perspectives. 
The first interprets current account balances as the counterpart of capital flows and asks to what 
extent they  can  be  explained  by  economic  convergence among  countries  with  different  per-
capita incomes. The second perspective interprets current accounts in the traditional way of 
exports and imports of goods and services and asks to what extent they can be explained by 
movements in aggregate real incomes and real exchange rates. 
 
We have divided the paper into 5 sections. After this brief introduction, we present some 




that  capital  tends  to  flow  from  high-income  euro  area  economies  to  low-income  euro  area 
economies. These flows have increased since the creation of the single currency in Europe. In 
Section 4, we turn our attention to extra-EMU trade and estimate a model of the trade balance of 
the euro area and individual member countries of the euro area with the rest of the world. We 
find  that  a  real  appreciation  of  the  euro  against  the  currencies  of  its  main  trading  partners 
appears to have a substantial effect on the euro area’s net exports in the long run, though the 
immediate effect is small. Our estimates for individual countries suggest that the adjustment to a 
real appreciation of the euro would not be equally distributed across euro-area countries. In 
particular, Germany would bear the largest share of the adjustment, while the other large euro-
area economies would be relatively unaffected. Finally, we find that the introduction of the euro 
seems to have changed the dynamics of trade balance adjustment in three of the larger euro-
area economies. We close with a few concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Stylized facts 
 
 
This  section  presents  some  of  the main  stylised facts  about  individual  EMU member 
countries’ current account balances. Figure 1 shows the current account balances for the euro 
area as a whole and for individual EU countries in selected years since 1985. As an aggregate, 
the euro area tends to be financially largely selfcontained and contribute little to absorb current 
account imbalances in other parts of the world. Current account balances were typically small 
over this 20 year period, with 1995 being a noticeable exception. This is not withstanding the 
fact that some EU countries have sizable current account imbalances. Germany, for example, 
has recorded annual surpluses of around $100 billion in recent years. Germany’s surplus is 
estimated to have reached 4¼ percent of GDP in 2006. This has brought Germany back to its 
traditional position of surplus, which we observe in 1985. Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands 
have run even larger surpluses relative to GDP in the past six years. In contrast, Portugal’s 
current account deficit was nearly 10 percent of GDP in 2006, while deficits in Greece and Spain 




                                                 









Figure 2. European current account balances (% of GDP) 
 





Figure 2 shows the evolution of current account balances under EMU. There is a group 
of countries consisting of Luxembourg, Finland, the Netherlands, and Germany, that consistently 
ran  surpluses  during  the  past  five  years.  Germany  registered  small  current  account  deficits 
averaging about 1 percent of GDP during most of the 1990s. The German balance swung into 
surplus in 2002 and the surplus has widened steadily over recent years as German exports have 
outpaced  imports.  Recent  years  have  also  seen  a  marked  increase  in  the  current  account 
surplus  in  the  Netherlands,  while  Finland’s  surplus  has  returned  to  roughly  its  level  at  the 
beginning of EMU, after widening to nearly 10 percent in 2001. At the other end of the spectrum, 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain have consistently run current account deficits in the past five years, 
and their deficits have widened significantly under EMU and during the period in the run-up to 
EMU. All three countries had current account positions close to balance around the mid-1990s. 
Recent years have seen an especially sharp decline in Spain’s current account balance from 
roughly  3½  percent  of  GDP  in  2003  to  an  estimated  8¼  percent  of  GDP  in  2006.  Current 
account  deficits  of  the  magnitudes  seen  in  Greece,  Portugal,  and  Spain  at  present  are 
unprecedented among euro area countries, with the exception of Ireland in the mid-1980s and 
Portugal in the 1970s (European Commission, 2006).  
Current account deficits of more than 8 percent of GDP are also large compared with 
other non-euro-area advanced economies. Continual current account deficits accumulate to the 
net  international  investment  position.  Net  external  liabilities  relative  to  GDP  have  soared  to 
nearly 80 percent in Greece, 60 percent in Portugal, and 40 percent in Spain.  
One interpretation of the evolution of current account balances under EMU is that the increased 
dispersion  of  current  account  positions  has  been  driven  by  trade  flows  that  reflect  shifts  in 
relative competitiveness within the euro area. (See, for example, Blanchard 2006, European 
Commission 2006, and Munchau 2006). 





















Figure 2c. Current account balances under EMU (% of GDP) 
 
 
Source: IMF. Estimates for 2006 from IMF WEO September 2006. 
 
 
On this account, aggregate demand was too strong in some countries and too weak in 
others, resulting in persistent differences in inflation rates across countries. In fact, the size and 
persistence of inflation differentials at the national level is one of the most widely recognized and 
documented facts relating to the start of EMU. As a result of persistent differences in inflation 
across  countries,  euro  area  economies  have  experienced  very  sizeable  swings  in  the  real 
exchange  rates  vis-à-vis  their  peers,  as  shown  in  Figure  3.  In  turn,  the  changes  in 
competitiveness associated with these movements in real exchange rates may have played a 
role in bringing about the large swings in current account balances. The relationship between 
real exchange rate developments and current account balances portrayed in Figure 4 appears to 
confirm  that  countries  that  have  gained  (lost)  competitiveness  relative  to  other  euro-area 
countries during EMU are now running large current account surpluses (deficits). 
In particular, Blanchard (2006) ascribes Portugal’s economic boom in the late 1990s to the sharp 
drop in interest rates and heightened expectations for faster convergence that resulted from 
participation  in  EMU.  Rapid  economic  growth  and  a  decline  in  unemployment  lead  to  an 
increase in wage growth to a rate substantially above the growth in labour productivity. As a 
result, competitiveness deteriorated sharply, export growth weakened, and Portugal’s trade and 
current account deficits widened markedly. Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry (2006) document that over 




percentage  points  below  the  euro  area  average.  Greece,  Italy,  and  Spain  also  experienced 
relatively sluggish growth in gross exports over this period. 
 














Figure 3c. Real exchange rates 
 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
 
 
Figure 4. Real exchange rate and current account balances 
 
 





Some commentators have linked the strong performance of German exports over recent 
years to gains in competitiveness associated with a rate of inflation that has been persistently 
below the euro area average (see Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry, 2006; Münchau 2006). According 
to this view, wage restraint, facilitated by a decline in unionization in Germany’s labour market, 
has  kept  growth  in  unit  labour  costs  well  below  the  euro  area  average,  boosting  the 
competitiveness of German exporters. Revealingly, two-thirds of the 1.2 percent annual average 
growth in German GDP over the period 1999-2005 came from net exports, with only one-third 
from growth in domestic demand (Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry, 2006). 
The policy implication from this perspective is that, in order to achieve internal balance, 
deficit countries in the euro area need fiscal contractions to slow down aggregate demand and 
that the surplus countries ought to boost aggregate demand. One problem with this prescription, 
however, is that Germany and the Netherlands had troubles meeting their obligations under the 
Stability and Growth Pact until recently and have little room for manoeuvre with regard to fiscal 
policy. Most of the adjustment would thus have to come from the deficit countries. 
An important question is how the large current account deficits in Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain are being financed. The European Commission (2006) documents that a large part of the 
net financial inflows into these countries during EMU have taken the form of bank loans. For 
Greece, net portfolio inflows have also been important. Outflows of foreign direct investment 
have generally exceeded inflows in each of the three countries. In Germany, lending abroad by 
German banks exceeded foreign borrowing by German banks to the tune of about 2½ percent of 
GDP annually on average over the period 1999-2005. 
In contrast, in the period 1992-1998, German banks were significant net borrowers from 
the rest of the world. One hypothesis is that by eliminating exchange rate risk, the creation of the 
single currency in Europe has boosted financial flows from high-income to low-income countries 
in the euro area. Financial flows from high-income countries in the euro area to low-income 
countries outside of the euro area have not increased. Of course, EMU has coincided with other 
efforts to promote increased financial integration in Europe. In the next section, we examine in 
more  detail  the  pattern  of  net  financial  flows  between  European  countries  and  between 









3. Net financial flows and EMU 
 
 
The alternative interpretation of current account imbalances is that they reflect capital 
flows. Neoclassical growth theory predicts that capital should flow from rich countries to poor 
countries. Poor countries have lower levels of capital per worker— in part, that explains why they 
are poor. In poor countries, the scarcity of capital relative to labour should mean that the returns 
to  capital  are  high.  In  response,  savers  in  rich  countries  should  look  at  poor  countries  as 
profitable places in which to invest.
2 
In this section, we present some simple econometric evidence on the determinants of 
capital  flows  between  countries  in  the  EU-15  and  between  EU-15  countries  and  non-EU-15 
countries. Ideally, we would use individual country data on intra-EU-15 and extra-EU-15 current 
account positions to measure financial flows, but these data are not readily available. As a proxy 
for current account balances, therefore, we use intra-EU-15 and extra-EU-15 trade balances.
3 
Our main aim is to examine whether capital tends to flow from rich to poor EU-15 countries, and 




We use annual data on exports and imports of goods over the period 1981- 2005. Our 
sample covers the EU-15 countries, excluding Luxembourg. We have individual country data on 
both intra-EU-15 and extra-EU-15 exports and imports of goods. Exports and imports of services 
are not included because of a lack of reliable data. We consider intra-EU-15 trade balances 
(calculated  as  a  country’s  exports  to  other  EU-15  countries  less  imports  from  other  EU-15 
countries),  extra-EU-15  trade  balances  (calculated  as  a  country’s  exports  to  non-EU-15 
countries less imports from non-EU-15 countries), and total trade balances (calculated as the 
sum of intra-EU-15 and extra-EU-15 trade balances). We also focus on the subset of EU-15 
                                                 
2 In reality, surprisingly little capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (see Lucas, 
1990). Several candidate explanations have been put forward, including differences in human 
capital between rich and poor countries as well as failures in international capital markets that 
might account for the lack of flows. However, none of these candidates can come near to 
explaining quantitatively the observed shortage of capital flows relative to what economic 
theory would predict. 
3 Based on the AMECO data used below, the correlation between total trade balances and current 




countries that are members of the euro area. All data is taken from the European Commission’s 
AMECO data bank. 
Figure 5 plots over time the dispersion across countries of each of the five different types 
of trade balances, defined as the unweighted cross-section standard deviation. The dispersion in 
trade balances trended upwards during the 1990s and then accelerated somewhat after 1999. 
The observation of widening differences among the current account balances of EU member 
states is also found in Blanchard (2006), who looks at the total current account of each country 
with the rest of the world and shows that the dispersion also increases among OECD countries. 
Figure 5 shows that the dispersion of intra-EU trade balances is consistently larger than the 
dispersion of extra-EU trade balances, and that the former has risen faster than the latter since 
the  mid-1980s.  Separating  euro  and  non-euro  countries  from  the  EU-15  group  makes  no 
significant difference. 
Figure 6 shows the behaviour of the (unweighted) average of trade balances over the 
past 25 years. It indicates that the average EU-15 country had a trade surplus against its EU 
partners since the mid-1990s, and a slight deficit against non-EU countries since the start of 
EMU. We also counted the number of years in which a country’s trade balance against its EU 
partners had the same or the opposite sign from its trade balance against the rest of the world. 
Greece had the same sign on both balances in all 25 years, Portugal in 23 years and Spain in 
21 years. In contrast, Germany and the Netherlands had opposite signs on the two balances in 
all 25 years. Thus, countries running deficits against their EU partners consistently in past years 
tended  to  borrow  from  those  and  from  the rest  of  the  world.  In  contrast,  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands tended to borrow from the rest of the world and lend to other EU countries, thus 
positioning themselves as financial intermediaries in Europe. 

















Table  1  shows  the  correlation  coefficients  between  the  intra  and  the  extra  EU  trade 
balances for  our sample  countries. For Germany,  Spain, the Netherlands, and Portugal,  the 
correlation is significantly negative, i.e., an increasing trade deficit w.r.t. other EU countries tends 
to be compensated by a shrinking deficit w.r.t. the rest of the world. For the other countries, the 
correlation is positive. Table 2 reports the results of bi-variate causality tests between intra and 
extra  EU  trade  balances.  Generally,dynamic  correlations  between  the  two  are  small  and 
insignificant. In Spain and Portugal, we find causality running from the extra to the intra EU trade 
balance with a negative effect of the former on the latter. In Finland, there is causality in the 
same direction, but with a positive effect. In Spain, Austria and the UK, we find causality from the 
intra to the extra EU balance, with a positive effect in the case of Spain and the UK, and a 
negative effect in the case of Austria. 
 
Table 1. Correlation between Intra and Extra-EU Trade Balances 
 
 
Table 2. Causality Tests Between Intra and Extra-EU Trade Balances 
 
 
Note: Table entries are the p-values of an F-test of the significance of two lags of the potentially causal variable in a 
regression where two lags of the caused variable are used. All regressions are in first differences. 
 





3.2 Trade balances and income per capita 
 
We run some simple OLS regressions to examine the determinants of trade balances in 
individual European countries. We are particularly interested in any possible relationship 
between trade balances (and therefore financial flows) and income per capita. The dependent 
variable in our regressions is the ratio of the trade balance to GDP. We consider three variations 
of the dependent variable, corresponding to the different measures of the trade balance for EU-
15 countries discussed above: total trade balance to GDP, intra-EU-15 trade balance to GDP, 
and extra-EU-15 trade balance to GDP. 
The main explanatory variable is real per-capita GDP. We also include this variable interacted 
with a dummy variable for the start of EMU in 1999, and dummies for the euro and the non-eura 
area countries from 1999 on. We also included a dummy variable for German unification, but this 
turned out not to be statistically significant. 
Our  results  are  presented  in  Table  3A-C.  We  report  four  specifications  for  each 
dependent  variable.  The  first  uses  only  the  dummies  and  GDP-per-capita  as  explanatory 
variables. The second adds the general government balance as a ratio of GDP and the real 
price of oil in US dollars. The former is motivated by the effect public sector deficits have on the 
current  account  in  conventional  macro  models.  The  latter  is  motivated  by  the  fact  that  EU 
countries  except  the  UK  are  dependent  on  oil  imports.  The  third  specification  adds  time 
dummies to the model and uses a GLS estimator accounting for panel heteroskedasticity and 
first-order autocorrelation of the residuals. The final specification adds a number of additional 
explanatory  variables  as  a  robustness  check,  namely  real  GDP-per-capita  in  the  EU  and  a 
measure of the real effective exchange rate. 
Consider Table 3A, column A. We find that trade surpluses within the EU are a positive 
function  of  per-capita  income  in  the  EU-15  and  that  the  relationship  is  strongly  statistically 
significant. Generally, countries with larger per-capita GDPs have larger intra EU trade balances. 
Before the start of EMU, the effect of a rising GDP per capita on a country’s intra-EU trade 
balance is 0.59. This positive coefficient becomes notably and significantly stronger for the euro-
area  countries  after  the  beginning  of EMU,  and  significantly  weaker  for  non-EMU  countries. 
Thus,  effect  we  observe  is  not  merely  a  general  effect  for  all  EU  countries.  Instead,  the 
estimates indicate that EMU has changed the direction of capital flows within the euro area 
significantly. 




The  remaining  specifications  show  that  this  result  is  robust.  Fiscal  balances  have  a 
significantly positive effect on the intra-EU trade balance. In the simplest specification, a rise in 
the fiscal balance by one percent of GDP raises the intra-EU trade balance by 0.25 percent of 
GDP. Including time dummies and using a GSL estimator reduces that effect to 0.11 percent of 
GDP.  Since  the  government  balance  might  be  considered  endogenous  relative  to  the  trade 
balance, e.g., because governments might pursue a current account target for fiscal policy, we 
also estimated models using an instrument for the government balance based on two lags of the 
government balance and two lags of the total trade balance as well as using the lagged balance 
as  an  explanatory  variable.  In  both  cases,  the  government  balance  retained  a  positive 
coefficient, but its marginal significance level dropped below 10 percent. 
4 
The real price of oil has a negative impact on the intra-EU trade balance, which is significant 
only in the GLS estimation in column C. We find that average EU GDP per capita has a negative 
effect on the trade balance, which is consistent with what one would expect from theory (e.g., 
Chinn and Prasad, 2003). However, the effect is not statistically significant. A country’s intra-EU 
real  effective  real  exchange  rate  has  a  significant,  negative  effect  on  the  trade  balance, 
consistent with standard open-economy macro models. Adding these controls does not change 
the main result regarding the effects of per-capita GDP and the EMU and non-EMU effects. 
Next, consider Table 3B, column A. Again, we find that trade surpluses are significantly 
and positively linked to real GDP per capital. However, this relationship does not change with 
the introduction of the euro, neither for euro-area countries nor for countries outside the euro 
area. This reinforces the suggestion that the introduction of the euro has changed net trade 
flows within the euro area alone.  
Interestingly, the fiscal balance has a positive coefficient in these regressions, but it is not 
statistically significant. This suggests that the effects of changes in fiscal balances fall primarily 
on intra-EU trade. The real oil price has a significantly negative effect on the trade balance. This 
effect, however, is only significant in the smaller specifications of columns B and C. 
Finally, Table 3C confirms the same results for total trade balances. The effect of per-
capita GDP on total trade balances increases for the euro-area countries with the beginning of 
EMU, while it decreases for the non-euro area countries. The effect of fiscal balances on total 
trade balances is positive and significant. A rise in the fiscal balance by one percent of GDP 
raises the trade balance by about 0.2 percent of GDP. This indicates that only about one percent 
                                                 
4 We also estimated models using instruments for the government budget balance for the extra-EU 
trade balance and the total trade balance. The results were similar and are not reported below. 




of Portugal’s trade deficit of 12.6 percent in 2005 can be explained by its general government 
deficit of 5.6 percent. Meanwhile, Spain’s trade deficit (8.6 percent of GDP in 2005) would have 
been even larger had the country not had a government surplus of one percent of GDP. 
5 
These results suggest that EMU has increased capital market integration in Europe with 
the result that capital flows are now more in line with what neoclassical growth theory predicts. 
As  capital  flows  from  high-per  capita  GDP  to  low-per  capita  GDP  countries,  they  can  be 
expected to promote economic convergence among the euro-area countries. This means that 
the allocation of capital is becoming more efficient in Europe, and that the observed current 
account  imbalances  indicate  that  the  monetary  union  works  well.  By  implication,  a  fiscal 
expansion in the surplus countries would tend to absorb more of their domestic savings and 
slow down capital flows to poorer countries, thus rendering EMU less efficient. 
Given the simplicity of our estimated equations, these results are suggestive rather than 
definitive. Nonetheless, our reading of the results is that monetary union seems to have made a 
difference in that high-income countries have become lenders to low-income countries within 
EMU much more than on a global scale. This shows that monetary union has greatly increased 
capital  market  integration  among  the  participating  countries.  More  efficient  capital  allocation 
within the region is a major benefit from monetary union. But note that monetary integration, not 
unlike trade integration, also seems to have had a negative effect on capital market integration 
between euro-area countries and non-euro area countries. This effect, which is in analogy to the 
well-known  trade  diversion  effect  of  trade  integration,  implies  a  possible  worsening  of  the 









                                                 
5 De Santis and Lührmann (2006) and Chinn and Prasad (2003) find that relative per-capita income has 
a positive effect on the current account balance in a large panel of countries running frm 1970 to 2003. 
They also employ squared relative income as a regressor. Following their papers, we used squared per 
capita income as an additional regressor in the models for the intra, extra, and total balances but did not 
find a significant effect. 






Table 3A. Dependent Variable Intra EU Trade Balance 
 
Note: GLS estimator accounts for heteroskedasticity between countries and countryspecific autocorrelation of 














Table 3B. Dependent Variable Extra-EU Trade Balance 
Note: GLS estimator accounts for heteroskedasticity between countries and countryspecific autocorrelation of 












Table 3C. Dependent Variable Total Trade Balance 
Note: GLS estimator accounts for heteroskedasticity between countries and countryspecific autocorrelation of 









4. Monetary Union and the Feldstein Horioka Puzzle 
 
 
In  a  seminal  contribution  to  open-economy  macro  economics,  Feldstein  and  Horioka 
(1980) showed that, at the time, international capital market integration was much weaker than 
generally perceived. They did this based on a simple reasoning. With complete international 
capital market integration, a country’s rate of investment should be uncorrelated with its rate of 
savings.  Any  excess  of  investment  over  savings  would  simply  be  absorbed  by  the  current 
account balance. This suggests that the regression coefficient of the investment on the savings 
ratio, which is called the savings retention coefficient, should not be statistically different from 
zero. However, Feldstein and Horioka showed that, in an international panel, that coefficient was 
much closer to one than to zero. Subsequent literature has shown that the savings retention 
coefficient has declined in international panels since the 1980s.
6 This is in line with the general 
perception that the degree of international capital markets integration has increased since then. 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) revisit this issue in the context of EMU. They use annual 
data for investment and savings ratios of OECD, EU, and euro-area countries from 1975 to 2000 
and estimate savings retention coefficients. Blanchard and Giavazzi show that savings retention 
coefficients generally from levels of 0.5 to values close to zero for all three groups of countries. 
Showing that savings retention coefficients declined would support our interpretation of 
the current account imbalances in the euro area, since it is another aspect of looking at capital 
market  integration. With  this  in  mind,  we  consider  Feldstein  Horioka  regressions  for  our  14 
countries and the period from 1981 to 2005. The dependent variable is the gross investment 
rate, which includes public sector investment. The explanatory variable is the gross savings rate, 









                                                 
6 See e.g. Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) and Hericourt and Maurel (2005) for a recent, comprehensive 




Table 4. Feldstein Horioka Regressions for EU Countries, 1981-2005 
   Dependent Variable: Gross Investment Rate 
 
Source: Own estimations 
 
Table  4  reports  the  results.  The  coefficient  on  the  gross  savings  rate  is  0.43  and 
statistically significant. This is lower than what Feldstein and Horioka found, but well in line with 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002). Interacting the gross savings rate with an EMU dummy for the 
euro-area countries yields a negative coefficient of -0.63. The total effect post-1999 of -0.23 is 
not statistically different from zero. Thus, domestic investment has been completely decoupled 
from domestic savings in the euro-area countries. Interacting the gross savings rate with our 
non-EMU  dummy  yields  a  negative  coefficient  which  is  much  smaller  and  not  statistically 
different from zero. Thus, table 4 supports our results that EMU has increased capital market 
integration within the region, but not for outsiders. 
 
 
5. Estimating trade balance models 
 
 
The emphasis in the previous section was on capital flows within the euro area. In this 
section, we present empirical estimates of a model explaining the trade balance of the euro area 
and individual member countries of the euro area with the rest of the world. We use quarterly 




computed  for  the  ten  most  important  trade  partners  outside  the  euro  area.  This  covers 
approximately 60 percent of the total trade with the rest of the world. For the member countries, 
we use total exports (imports) and subtract exports (imports) to other euro-area countries. We 
use data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade statistics, and focus on exports and imports of goods 
since, as mentioned earlier, data for trade in services are not readily available, nor are current 
account data with regard to non-euro area countries. Exports and imports are measured in U.S. 
dollars for all countries. We normalize the trade balance by dividing by domestic GDP in U.S. 
dollars. 
Our baseline model seeks to explain the trade balance using domestic and foreign real 
GDP and the effective real exchange rate. For each country and the euro area, we calculate 
“foreign” GDP by taking the nominal GDP of the ten most important trade partners outside the 
euro area converted into US dollars and deflating it by the US CPI. Our regressions use the ratio 
of domestic real GDP to foreign real GDP as an explanatory variable. Note that domestic real 
GDP  is computed in  terms  of the relevant country’s  or  the  euro  area’s  own  currency,  while 
“foreign”  real GDP  is calculated in terms  of  real US  dollars. Converting  the former into  real 
dollars - or the latter into real euros – would result in a series which is entirely dominated by real 
exchange rate movements such that the information about real GDP is wiped out. Both real GDP 
series are computed as indexes with the first quarter of 1999 as base period and are converted 
into logs. 
Figures 7-13 show the trade balances relative to GDP together with the real exchange 
rates and the relative GDP variables. For the euro area, Figure 7 gives three measures of the 
trade account. The line CA gives the trade balance of the aggregate euro area according to the 
IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (December 2006). “Extra CA” gives the sum of all of euro 
area-countries net exports to the rest of the world less the same countries’ net exports to other 
euro-area countries. The figure shows that there are some data discrepancies that are due to 
the statistical separation of Belgium and Luxembourg in the late 1990s. The figure also shows 
the euro-area’s net exports to its ten most important trade partners. This line tracks the total 
trade balance very closely except for a period in the mid-1990s. 
  Figure 7 shows that for the euro area as a whole the trade balance has remained within a 
band of plus/minus 2 percent of GDP in all but two years in the past 25 years, and the two 
exceptions are in the early part of the sample. In the past 10 years, it has hovered between zero 
and  2  percent  of  GDP.  There  are  larger  discrepancies  across  the  four  largest  euro-area 
economies, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, as shown in Figure 9. Individual trade balances 




experienced trade deficits throughout the period, the other three large economies consistently 





























Figure 8 shows the relative GDP of the euro area against its ten largest trade partners (in 
logs, as explained above). The series oscillates between -0.05 and 0.1 with a slight upward 
trend  since  the  mid-1980s.  The  figure  also  shows  the  real  exchange  rate  of  the  euro  area 
against its ten largest trade partners. Following a large real depreciation of the euro in the first 
half of the 1980s, we observe a real appreciation in the subsequent decade, and especially in 
the years 1992-1995. This was followed by a rapid depreciation which ended in an appreciation 
after 2001 that brought the real value of the euro back to its long-run average. Figures 10-13 
show that individual country experiences exhibit similar patterns, although with swings of larger 
amplitudes. On aggregate, therefore, the euro area is less volatile against outside countries than 
its individual member countries. A notable exception to the general impression is the relative 
GDP series for Spain, which exhibits a continuous upward trend throughout the period. 

































































































Table 5 presents estimates of a simple model of dynamic adjustment of the trade 
balance. The dependent variable is the trade balance of the euro area and its four largest 
constituent economies with regard to non-euro area economies. The explanatory variables are a 
lagged dependent variable, the growth rate of domestic real GDP less the growth rate of the real 
GDP of the ten largest (non-euro area) trade partners, and the effective real exchange rate 
against the ten largest non-euro area trade partners. The effective real exchange rate is 
measured in logs. The estimates are based on quarterly data. Preliminary estimates using more 
elaborate lag structures did not yield qualitatively different results. 
The  estimates  show  that  trade  balances  are  very  persistent.  The  first-order  auto-
regression coefficients range between 0.7 and 0.8 for the individual countries and the coefficient 
for the euro-area aggregate is 0.89. For the euro area, the coefficients on the relative real-




An increase in the domestic real growth rate by one percent above the foreign growth rate leads 
to a fall in the trade balance by 0.024 percent of GDP on impact, and 0.22 percent in the long 
run. A rise in the real exchange rate by 10 percent lowers the trade balance by 0.084 percent on 
impact, and by 0.76 percent in the long run. Thus, a real appreciation of the euro against its 
main trade partners seems to have a substantial effect on net exports in the long run, although 
the immediate effect is small. 




Table 5. Estimated trade balance models 
 
 
Turning  to  the  individual  countries,  the  performance  of  the  model  estimates  is 
considerably weaker. Germany is the only euro-area country whose trade balance with respect 
to  non-euro  area  countries  responds  significantly  to  changes  in  both  the  relative  real  GDP 




percent leads to a fall in the trade balance by 0.055 percent on impact and 0.25 percent in the 
long  run.  A  real  appreciation  by  10  percent  against  the  ten  most  important  non-euro-area 
countries leads to a fall in the trade balance by 0.2 percent of GDP on impact and 0.9 percent in 
the long run. While the other countries show similar responses to changes in the relative GDP 
growth rate, the responses of the Italian and Spanish trade balances to changes in the real 
exchange rate are much weaker and not statistically significant. For France, we use the real 
exchange rate and its first lag in the model. While the current real exchange rate has a positive 
coefficient, the lagged real exchange rate has a negative coefficient and the total effect has the 
expected negative sign. These estimates indicate that the adjustment to a real appreciation of 
the euro against third countries would not be equally distributed across euro-area countries. 
Germany would bear the largest part of the adjustment, while the other large economies would 
seem relatively unaffected. 
Next, we augment these models by a dummy variable which is zero until the fourth quarter of 
1998 and one from the first quarter of 1999 onwards. This dummy allows us to test for and 
estimate the size of structural breaks in the model coefficients at the start of EMU. We interact 
the dummy with all explanatory variables in the model. For the euro-area aggregate and for 
Germany, all terms with this dummy are statistically insignificant. We do not report them below. 
For France, Italy, and Spain, in contrast, we find evidence for structural breaks around the start 
of EMU. Table 6 shows the results. 
For France and Italy, we find that the persistence of the trade balance is significantly 
weaker after the start of EMU. The combined first-order autoregressive coefficient is 0.28 for 
France and 0.09 for Italy after the start of EMU. For Spain, the persistence of the trade balance 
remains unchanged, but we find that the responsiveness of the trade balance to changes in the 
relative real growth rate vanishes after 1999. In contrast, the Spanish trade balance becomes 
responsive to changes in the real exchange rate, although the effect remains small. In sum, the 
introduction of the euro seems to have changed the dynamics of trade balance adjustment in 
















The persistence of the trade balances reported in our results is closely in line with VAR 
results for Germany, France, and Italy by Lee and Chinn (2006). These authors also find a very 
weak and statistically insignificant response of the French and Italian current accounts to the 
real exchange rate, while the German current account responds negatively and significantly to 
changes in the German real exchange rate.
7 
One weakness of the data used so far is that the trade weights employed to calculate the real 
effective exchange rates and the real GDP of the ten largest trade partners are based on trade 
data in 2005. The group of the 10 largest trade partners therefore includes countries that did not 
exist as sovereign countries or did not participate in world trade as market economies in the 
1980s. Furthermore, the opening of Central and Eastern Europe to international trade and the 
rise of China as a trading nation have changed the trade weights significantly over the past 15 
years. 
To avoid potential biases resulting from these changes, we calculate the shares of the 
euro area with non-euro area countries for each year since 1981 and recomputed the real GDP 
of the 10 largest trade partners and the effective real exchange rate on that basis. Figures 14 
and  15  show  the  difference  these  recalculations  make  for  the  explanatory  variables  of  our 
model. Figure 14 indicates that the new relative real GDP series lies above the original one for 
all years during the 1980s. This suggests that the trade weights from 2005 give too much weight 
to countries with relatively low GDP in the 1980s. The two series converge in the mid-1990s, 
suggesting that there are no large changes in the trade structure of the euro area thereafter. 
Figure 15 shows that the new effective real exchange rate series lies below the original one 
during the 1980s, suggesting that the 2005 trade weights give too much weight to countries with 
relatively weak currencies in the 1980s. The series exhibits a noticeable jump in 1990, the year 
when China first appears among the top 10 trade partners of the euro area, while other countries 








                                                 
7 Arghyrou and Chortareas (2006) report lower persistence of the current accounts of EU countries and 
similar effects of the real exchange rate. However, these authors do not distinguish between intra and 
extra EMU trade and do not account for the effects of income growth. 







































Table  7  reports the  results  of  estimating  our trade  balance model  with  the  new  data 
series. The upper part of the table uses the full data set again. It shows that the persistence of 
the trade balance remains very large, while the coefficient on the relative real GDP growth rates 
has is somewhat smaller and the coefficient on the real exchange rate is considerably smaller in 
numerical value than in Table 5. Nevertheless, the long-run effects of changes in relative real 
GDP growth and the real exchange rate are similar to those estimated in Table 5. 




Table 7: Trade balance models with dynamic trade shares 
 
 
The lower part of Table 7 uses data only starting in 1991. We do this in view of the break 
in the real exchange rate series in 1990. Here, we note a considerable decline in the persistence 
of the trade account. At the same time, the coefficient on the relative real GDP growth rate more 
than doubles, and the coefficient on the effective real exchange rate is twice the coefficient from 
the upper part. Compared to the estimates using fixed trade weights, the short-run reaction of 
the trade balance to changes in relative real GDP growth is much stronger, and the short-run 
reaction to changes in the effective real exchange rate is moderately stronger. Nevertheless, the 
long-run effects of changes in relative real GDP growth remain unchanged, while the long-run 
effect of the effective real exchange rate is smaller than those based on the estimates with fixed 
trade weights. A permanent appreciation of the real exchange rate of the euro by 10 percent 
lowers the trade account by 0.55 percent of euro-area GDP in the long run. 
 
 






We have documented a growing dispersion in current account balances among countries 
in the euro area since the early 1990s. The differences in current account positions widened 
significantly following the creation of EMU. We have shown, first, that EMU has changed the 
pattern of capital flows within Europe. Specifically, it has increased the tendency of capital flows 
to go from relatively rich to relatively poor countries within the euro area. This suggests that the 
observed current account imbalances are sign of the proper functioning of the euro area rather 
than a sign of improper macro economic management. 
 
Furthermore,  we  have  presented  some  preliminary  estimates  of  current  account 
adjustment of the euro area and its constituent economies. Our estimates indicate that the long-
run effect of a real appreciation of the euro against the currencies of its main trade partners is 
sizeable. Thus, in a scenario in which the dollar devalues against Asian currencies, the US 
current  account  closes,  but  Asian  countries  stubbornly  continue  to  run  current  account 
surpluses,  the  euro  area  would  experience  a  large  deterioration  of  its  trade  balance. 
Furthermore, this deterioration would be distributed unevenly across its member economies, at 
least  in  the  short  run.  Such  a  development  could  indeed  pose  a  serious  challenge  to  the 
sustainability of the common currency. More empirical work, currently under way, is needed to 
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